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SUMMARY: This paper studies the interaction between the performance of firms and unions and the
environmental policy chosen by governments when there is a negative environmental externality from
production of a good which only affects the country where the firm is located. I assume that governments
choose an upper limit on emissions, unions choose the wage rates and firms choose the employment level.
Specifically, I analyze the effect that unionized labor markets have on environmental policy.
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Política medioambiental y negociación salarial
RESUMEN: En este artículo estudiamos el efecto del comportamiento de empresas y trabajadores sobre
la política medioambiental, cuando existe contaminación local. Suponemos que el gobierno elige la polí-
tica medioambiental, basada en un límite sobre las emisiones, mientras que los sindicatos (si hay) eligen
el salario y las empresas el nivel de empleo. En concreto, analizamos el efecto de que los trabajadores es-
tén o no sindicados en la política medioambiental. 
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1. Introduction
Concerns about environmental quality have always been important in the deci-
sions of governments. But in recent years concern about environmental problems
has been growing (see, for example, Hoel (1997b) or Ulph (2000) among others).
Governments may be interested in toughening their environmental policies because
increased pollution produced by the expansion of consumption, production and
trade leads them to protect the environment. But, on the other hand, governments
may have incentives to relax their environmental policy to give their domestic pro-
ducers an advantage in competitive international markets. The resulting reduction in
cost may lead to increased investment by producers, thus increasing output and em-
ployment.
The aim of this paper is to examine the interaction between environmental policy
and union-firm bargaining. In particular, the paper analyzes the effect that unionized
labor markets have on the environmental policy set by governments. Carraro et al.
(1996) show that when union bargaining power is lower and, therefore, labor markets
are more competitive employment is higher but the control of polluting emissions is
weaker.
In debates about environmental policy the possible effects of environmental regu-
lations on employment often play an important role. That is, the institutional features
of labour markets are important determinants of environmental policies. Hoel (1998)
examines the effect that environmental taxes and other forms of quotas and direct re-
gulations have on employment. He gets the result that if wages are exogenous, em-
ployment is higher with environmental taxes than with other forms of environmental
regulations. In a context with perfect competition and transboundary pollution, Hoel
(1997a) analyzes whether there may be reasons for coordinating environmental poli-
cies across countries when wages are determined through bargaining between firms
and unions. An important conclusion is that policy coordination is unnecessary in
many cases. Bárcena-Ruiz and Garzón (2003) study how the existence of wage inco-
mes influences the choice of environmental policy by governments when the location
of firms is endogenous. Governments want polluting firms to locate in their countries
because of the positive incomes that these firms generate, even though they damage
the environment.
There is an extensive literature about the interaction between environmental po-
licy and the labor market due to the fact that many European economies suffer from
high levels of unemployment. Fredriksson and Gaston (1999) show that when the
union is concerned with both the wages and employment of its members, its welfare
is negatively related to pollution taxes. Bovenberg and Van der Ploeg (1998) analyze
the effects of environmental tax reform on environmental quality and employment.
In this paper, I adopt the same framework considered by Ulph (1996) but assume
that all workers are unionized. He studies the choice of environmental policy when
both governments and producers can act strategically. In this framework I analyze the
choice of environmental policy by governments when firms compete in an internatio-
nal market. These firms are unionized and unions set wages (i.e., I consider the mo-nopoly-union model). For the sake of reference, I compare this case with the situation
in which wages are exogenous. I assume that environmental damage is strictly local 1
and the environmental policy used in this analysis is emissions standards. 
The results obtained in the paper depend on market size, which in turn depends
on (i) valuation of the environment, (ii) reservation wage and (iii) valuation of em-
ployment. I assume that unions set the same value on wage and employment. If the
market size is small enough the environmental policy set by governments is weaker if
unions choose wages than if wage is exogenous. The government allows greater envi-
ronmental damage due to the increase of the union’s utility than can be compensated
for by the lower consumers’ and producers’ surplus and, as a result, social welfare is
higher if the union chooses the wage. If the market size is large enough, the environ-
mental policy is stricter when the union chooses the wage than when the wage is exo-
genous, with lower social welfare resulting in the former case. Although the union’s
utility is higher and the environmental damage is lower when the union chooses the
wage, the welfare will be higher if wages are exogenous since the consumer and pro-
ducer surpluses are greater in the second case.
The results obtained in the paper do not change if countries differ in their valua-
tion of the environment, if the reservation wage differs from one country to the other
or if unions have different valuations of employment.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Sec-
tion 3 examines the choice of environmental standard if the union chooses the wage,
while section 4 analyses the situation if wages are exogenous. Section 5 presents the
main result of the paper, comparing the two cases, and section 6 concludes.
2. The model
There are two firms, 1 and 2, that produce a homogeneous good with the same
technology. Each firm is located in a different country (1 and 2) 2. Both firms sell their
good on a world market. For the sake of simplicity, the cost of transport and other
costs related to the selling of the product abroad are taken as being zero. I assume that
both firms are unionized and wage bargaining takes place at firm level.
The inverse demand function of both countries is linear: p = a – 2yi, i =1,2, where
p is the world market price of the good, a is the market size and yi is the amount of the
good sold in country i. Assume that environmental pollution does not modify market
demand. The demand of the world market is given by the sum of the demands of
countries i and j: p = a – y, where y = yi + yj. In equilibrium, the quantity demanded
is equal to the quantity supplied, thus the world inverse demand function is: p = a – qi
– qj,i   ≠ j, i, j = 1,2, where yi + yj = qi + qj; qi is the output level of firm i (i = 1,2).
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1 Examples of local damage include firms emitting gases and chemical substances or producing
noise. 
2 I assume that the location of firms is fixed. For analyses of the effect of environmental policy on
the location of firms see, for instance, Hoel (1997b), Markusen (1997) and Bárcena-Ruiz and Garzón
(2003). Consumers buy the good on the world market. The consumers’surplus of country
i is given by the difference between the price paid by consumers in that country and
the price they would be willing to pay, which is given by the demand function of the
country; therefore
CSi =  = =  (yi)2, i = 1,2 [1]
where p = a – 2yi, which depends on the output of both firms.
There is a pollutant associated with the production of the good. Specifically, each
unit of output produces one unit of pollutant. Once environmental policy is introdu-
ced, firms either reduce their output or engage in abatement, which mainly represents
end-of-pipe emission reduction. Technology exhibits a constant return to scale such
that qi = Li, where Li denotes the employment level that firm i hires in country i. Net
emissions of this firm, ei, are: ei = qi – xi, where qi are the emissions generated by
firm i as function of the level of output, and xi is the level of abatement of firm i (Ulph
(1996)). Thus, to control environmental damage government i chooses the environ-
mental standard, an upper limit on the emissions that may be emitted by firm i 3. 
Firm i must not exceed the limit in the standard set by the government i, thus it
has to pay a pollution abatement cost 4. Following Ulph (1996), total costs of abate-
ment are C(xi) = (xi)2,x i ≥ 0. On the other hand, each firm hires Li workers with a
wage rate wi. It therefore bears a wage cost Liwi, so the profit function of firm i is:
π i = [a – qi – qj – wi] qi –  (qi – ei)2,i   ≠ j , i,j = 1,2 [2]
The next step is to specify the union’s utility function (see, for example Malcom-
son (1987)). It is reasonable to assume that the union cares about both wages and em-
ployment 5. The union is assumed to have a quasi concave utility function that de-
pends on both variables. I adopt a modified Stone-Geary utility function to represent
the union’s preferences. Hence, the utility function of the union can be written as: 6
URi = (wi – r) α Li
1–α , 0 < α < 1 [3]
where wi is the wage per unit of employment, and r ≥ 0 represents the alternative
wage which workers may expect to earn elsewhere, which is the same for all workers.
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3 The total emissions of firm i are equal to the maximum emissions allowed by the government, so
that profits increase with emission levels because pollution abatement costs are lower.
4 Investments made to diminish emissions include, for example, the use of filters that decrease the
toxicity of solid waste.
5 Empirical studies of unionized labor markets have used total rent (Brown and Ashenfelter (1986)),
or a Stone-Geary utility function (Dertrouzos and Pencavel (1981)) to represent the objective function of
the labor union.
6 This utility function is used in many papers analyzing wage bargaining. See for example, De Fraja
(1993) and Dobson (1994) among others. In the relevant literature decisions on employment and wage have been modeled
in different ways. Generally, the union has more power in decisions about wages than
about employment. To model this, I can use the right-to-manage model, in which
unions and firms bargain over wages and firms choose the employment level that ma-
ximizes profits. A special case of this model is the monopoly-union-model, where the
union sets the wage while the employer sets employment 7. 
I assume that the environmental damage function is a quadratic form and that it
depends only on the emissions generated in the relevant country 8; i.e. the pollutant
causes damage only to the local economy. The total environmental damage of
country i due to emissions generated in that country is
Di = λ (ei)2, i = 1,2 [4]
where λ  is a parameter that measures the valuation of the environment by the go-
vernment. I assume that both governments have the same valuation of the environ-
ment.
To set its environmental policy the government maximizes social welfare, which
comprises the consumer surplus (CSi), the producer surplus (PSi) and the union rents
(URi), less environmental damage (Di), as is standard in the relevant literature. Social
welfare is given by the following function
Wi = CSi + PSi + URi – Di,i   = 1,2 [5]
The above welfare function includes the union rents as that part of the producer
surplus which is absorbed by the union (see, for example, Brander and Spencer
(1988), Mezzetti and Dinopoulos (1991), Naylor (1998) and Bughin and Vannini
(1995)). The inclusion of union rents in the social welfare function can be interpreted
as follows. It could be assumed that each union is a firm that supplies an intermediate
input to produce a final good and the price of this input is w. I assume that producing
this intermediate input involves no cost. Thus, the producer surplus has to comprise
the profit of the firms that supply the intermediate input. This means that the union
rents can be understood as the profit of the firms that supply an intermediate input
[see, Horn and Wolinsky (1988)].
In equation [5], given that there is only one firm in each country and there are no
fixed costs, PSi = π i When wages are exogenous, URi = 0, because I assume that wor-
kers obtain their reservation wage and therefore this component does not exist in the
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7 An alternative model is the efficient bargaining model. This model has the drawback that at the ne-
gotiation stage there would have to be complete agreement between union and firm owners that employ-
ment should be set at its profit maximizing level. Then the interaction between product market and labor
market imperfections would be lost. On the other hand, the empirical evidence suggests that this model
does not reflect the way in which firms actually behave [Oswald and Turnbull (1985)].
8 This function assumes that environmental damage is a convex function of the emission level. See,
for example, Falk and Mendelsohn (1993), Van der Ploeg and Zeeuw (1992) and Ulph (1996). I analyze the effect of the environmental policy set by the governments when wa-
ges are endogenous. In order to highlight the results of the model, I will compare it
with the case of exogenous wages.
The timing of the game is as follows. In the first stage, each government sets
emission standards. In the second stage, the unions choose the wage (if it is not exo-
genous) and in the third stage the firms choose their output (employment). I solve by
backward induction to obtain a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.
3. The unions choose the wage
In this section, I assume that the governments of countries 1 and 2 set their envi-
ronmental standards independently and simultaneously before the unions choose the
wages. As a benchmark, I also analyze the case in which the cost of production is exo-
genous (that is, the wage is fixed). Given that there is no international cooperation, the
emission level is set by the Nash equilibrium of a non-cooperative game where both
countries choose their emissions by maximizing their social welfare function.
I shall first solve the third stage of the game in which firms choose their output
(employment) level. Firm i chooses the output level that maximizes its profit func-
tion, given by [2]. Deriving this expression respect to the output, we obtain 
a – 3qi – qj + ei – wi = 0, i ≠ j, i, j = 1,2 [6]
Solving equation [6] the output levels for both firms are obtained,
qi = Li =  , i ≠ j, i, j = 1,2 [7]
The standard set by the government affects both the firm’s output and abatement
emissions. If the government sets a high standard the firm increases its output and
employment. However, the higher the standard set by government the lower the aba-
tement emissions 9. Thus, the higher the pollution allowance level the higher the out-
put of that country and the lower the output of the other country. Also we can see that
the higher the wages paid to workers are, the lower the output of the firm and the hig-
her the output of the rival firm.
In the second stage, union i chooses the wage rate that maximizes its utility func-
tion subject to the labour demand constraint imposed by profit maximizing firm i.
wi (wj) = arg max [wi – r] α [qi]1–α i = 1,2 [8]
wi
where qi is given by [7]. Solving [8], the wage reaction functions are obtained:
2a – 3wi + wj + 3ei – ej
   
8
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∂ (qi – ei)
  
∂ eiwi = r +  , i ≠ j, i, j = 1,2  [9]
From [7] and [9], the manner in which wages and employment will react to chan-
ges in the emission standards chosen by the government is obtained.
wi = , i ≠ j, i, j = 1,2 [10]
Li = qi = , i ≠ j, i, j = 1,2 [11]
Equation [10] shows that the higher the pollution allowance level chosen by go-
vernment i and the lower the standard chosen by government j, the higher the wage
chosen by union i 10. 
Equation [11] shows that there is a positive relationship between the standard
chosen by the government i and the output (employment) level of firm i The higher
the weight given to wages by the union, the lower the increase in employment will be.
Moreover, an increase in the standard chosen by government j will decrease the out-
put of firm i. The lower the weight given to wages by the union, the higher this decre-
ase will be 11. 
It remains to solve the first stage of the game. Due to the existence of free trade
each government takes into account the decision of the other government when it
chooses its environmental standard. Therefore, there is strategic interaction between
the two countries because the decision taken by one country affects the other. In the
first stage, both governments simultaneously choose the environmental standard that
maximizes their social welfare as given by equation [5].
Substituting [10] and [11] in [5], I obtain the social welfare of country i, as a
function of the standards, ei and ej, whose expressions are shown in appendix A.1.
Maximizing equation [5] with respect to ei for country i (i = 1,2), I obtain the stan-
dard reaction function, that shows the negative relationship between the standards of
the two countries. The standards are strategic substitutes, i.e. if one country decides
to increase its standard, the best answer of the other country is to decrease its own
standard. The reaction functions are downward sloping because when government j
toughens its emission limit that will force firm j to cut its output and allow firm i to
expand its output. From the reaction functions I obtain the equilibrium standards cho-
sen by each government (ei
S,e j
S). I use superscript S to denote the variables if the
unions choose the wage. The expressions of the standards chosen by governments are
collected in appendix A.2.
3(1 – α )[2a(α + 3) – (9 – α )(r – ei) + 3(1 – α )(r – ej)]
      
8(9 – α 2)
2aα (3 + α ) + 9(1 – α )r + α [3(1 – α )(r – ej) + ei(9 – α )]
      
9 – α 2
α (2a + wj + 3ej – ej – 3r)
   
3
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10 =  > 0, =  < 0.
11 =  > 0, =  < 0. 
3(α – 1)(3α – 3)
  
8(α 2 – 9)
∂ Li  
∂ ej
3(α – 1)(9 – α )
  
8(α 2 – 9)
∂ Li  
∂ ei
3α (1 – α )
  
α 2 – 9
∂ wi  
∂ ej
α (α – 9)
  
α 2 – 9
∂ wi  
∂ ei4. Exogenous cost of production 
In this section I solve the case in which the wage is fixed. That is, I assume that
the costs of production are exogenous and equal to the workers’ reservation wage, r.
Now, the game has two stages: In the first stage, both governments choose the stan-
dard and in the second stage, both firms choose the output level.
In the second stage, firms maximize their profits as given by [2]. Solving the
first order condition, the equilibrium output levels given by [7] are obtained, assu-
ming wi = wj = r, so that wages are exogenous.
In the first stage, both countries’governments choose the environmental standard.
The social welfare function is given by Wi = CSi + PSi - Di,i   = 1,2 12. From the first
order conditions, the standard reaction function is obtained
ei = , i ≠ j, i, j = 1,2
I use superscript E to denote the variables if costs are exogenous. Therefore, the
standards chosen by both governments are
ei
E = , i = 1,2 [12]
5. Comparison of the two cases considered above
In this section I compare the results obtained in sections 3 and 4. I assume that
each firm’s union has the same valuation of wage and employment, that is, α = 0.5,
but the results are robust to changes in α since the effects are the same.
When wages are exogenous the workers’ utility is zero because they obtain a
wage equal to the reservation wage. But if the union chooses the wage, workers ob-
tain a positive utility because their wage is higher than the reservation wage. There-
fore, workers’ utility is higher when the union chooses the wage. The expressions of
the different terms of the social welfare function for the two cases are collected in ap-
pendix A.4. 
Let a1 = r + and  a* = r +  is the minimum market 
size 13, that is, a1 > a*.
Lemma 1: When unions have the same valuation of wage and employment in
equilibrium:
578 6     
255 + 840λ
17 6  (21 + 32λ )
  
1072(1 + λ )
11 (a – r)
  
21 + 32 λ
22a – 22r – 7ej   
35 + 64λ
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12 The expressions of each component of social welfare function are in appendix A.3. 
13 It is assumed that a > a* to assure that output and pollution abatement level are positive. I as-
sume, without loss of generality, that λ > 1.3 in order to eliminate cases when λ is small enough for the
market size to be lower than the minimum market size, a*, and therefore the abatement is negative. (i) CSE > CSS,
(ii) PSE > PSS,
(iii) eE ≥ eS and DE ≥ DS if and only if a ≥ a1 > a*.
Given that the production costs are lower when the union does not choose the
wage, the output is higher in that case and therefore the consumers’ surplus is also
greater. Firms’profits are higher if production costs are exogenous, because although
the output is greater the production costs are lower. As a result, the producer’s surplus
is higher in this case.
Given λ and r, the higher a is, the higher the standard chosen by the government i
will be,  > 0, i = E,S . The government sets a higher standard for firms so that 
they produce more, due to the weight of the consumer surplus in the social welfare
function. When wages are exogenous, the standard varies more in line with market 
size if the union chooses the wage   >   , so that the output and consumer 
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Figure 1.
As figure 1 shows, for small enough market sizes, a < a1, the standard chosen by
the government is higher when the union chooses the wage than if the wage is exoge-
nous, eS > eE. By (i) and (ii) we have that both consumer surplus and producer surplus
are higher when wages are exogenous. But when the market is small enough, the gre-
ater weight of workers’ utility on social welfare when the union chooses the wage
means that the government sets a higher standard, allowing greater environmental da-
mage. The increase in the output level reached with a lax standard produces higher
consumer and producer surpluses, and increases workers’utility. This last term of the
social welfare function allows environmental damage to be greater when the union




eSWhen the market is large enough, a > a1, this result changes. As market size in-
creases consumer surplus and firms’profits increase too. This rise is greater if the wa-
ges are exogenous than if the union chooses the wage. Moreover, environmental da-
mage also is greater when wages are exogenous because output grows by a higher
proportion in that case (in spite of firms abating their emissions more). When wages
are exogenous the standard chosen by the government is higher, eE > eS, due to the in-
crease in consumer surplus and producer surplus, in spite of workers’ utility being
greater in the other case. As a result, when the union chooses the wage the environ-
mental damage is lower.
Let a2 = r +  , where a* < a1 < a2. The expressions of ψ (λ ) and ø(λ ) are 
shown in appendix A.4.
Proposition 1: If unions have the same valuation of wage and employment, WE ≥
WS if and only if a ≥ a2.
Next, I compare the different terms of the social welfare function to explain why
social welfare is higher when wages are exogenous, for a large enough market. The
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Figure 2.
If the market is small enough (a < a1), when the production costs are exoge-
nous the consumer and producer surpluses are higher than if the union chooses
the wage, but the difference is small. By contrast, when the union chooses the
wage the workers’ utility is higher. Environmental damage, as we have seen in
lemma 1, is higher when the union chooses the wage. Thus, the higher workers’
utility balances the lower consumer and producer surpluses and the greater envi-
ronmental damage. As a result, when the unions choose the wage, social welfare
is higher, WS > WE.
For intermediate market sizes, (a1 ≤ a < a2) the difference between consumer sur-
plus and producer surplus increases in both cases, due to the increase in production.
When the union chooses the wage the workers’utility increases due to the increase in
the number of workers hired and in wages. Moreover, as we have seen in lemma 1,
environmental damage increases when production costs are exogenous. As a result,
the difference between welfare in the two cases decreases, but nevertheless I find that
WS > WE. This result arises from the fact that when production costs are exogenous
environmental damage is higher. 
eE < eS;  DE < DS eE > eS;  DE > DS
|-----------------------------|------------------------------|----------------------------> a 
a* a1 a2































































The last case can be observed when a ≥ a2. As market size increases the output
grows higher in proportion when production costs are exogenous. This causes consu-
mer and producer surpluses to increase with respect to the case in which the union
chooses the wage. Although workers’ utility is higher and environmental damage is
lower, when the union chooses the wage, the weight of the consumer and producer
surpluses means that, if production costs are exogenous, social welfare will be higher,
WE > WS.
The results obtained in this section are robust to changes in α , (if unions value
employment and wages differently).
6. Conclusions
I have developed a simple model of oligopolistic product markets and unionized
labor markets. I have analyzed the interaction between variables that affect environ-
mental policy and variables in the labor market. The study blends two different the-
mes: on the one hand the choice of environmental policy by governments, and on the
other hand the effects on interaction in the product market of the wage process deter-
mined by unions.
Environmental policy affects producers’ behavior, so that if a government sets a
high (low) environmental standard then firms produce more (less). On the other hand,
the existence of unions that choose wages affects firms when they determine their le-
vel of output.
The outcomes obtained show that if unions have the same valuation of wage and
employment, the environmental policy chosen by the governments depends on mar-
ket size, and on whether the unions choose the wage or not. On the one hand, if the
market is large enough and unions do not choose the wage, the governments will set
higher environmental standards than if the unions choose the wage. On the other
hand, if the market is small enough and unions choose the wage, environmental po-
licy is lax and the governments will set higher environmental standards than if pro-
duction cost is exogenous.
Therefore, the existence of unions that choose wages increases social welfare if
the market is small enough. This is because workers’utility is higher than when pro-
duction costs are exogenous. But if the market is big enough, social welfare is higher
when production cost is exogenous, due to the increase in consumer and producer
surpluses.
The main results of the paper do not change if I assume that the government im-
poses environmental taxes instead of emission standards. The producer will abate po-
llution to the point where marginal abatement cost equals the emission tax.
The conclusions reached with the model studied are robust if I consider different
asymmetries. For example, considering that countries’environmental valuation is dif-
ferent or countries have different reservation wages, or that unions value employment
and wages differently, does not alter the main results. Nor do the results vary if go-
vernments choose environmental policy cooperatively.
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Appendix A.1
This appendix provides expressions for the different functions. The social welfare
function of country i when the union chooses the wage is: Wi = CSi + PSi + URi – Di ,
i = 1,2, where 
CSi = ,
PSi = (108(a2 + r2)(α – 1)2 (3 + α )2 – (2997 + α (4860 + α (–4338 +
α (540 + 37α ))))ei
2 – 162(α – 9)(α – 1)3 eiej + 243(α – 1)4 ej
2 + 108(α – 1)2 (3 + α )
r((α – 9)ei – 3(α – 1)ej 9 – 108α (α – 1)2 (3 + α )(2(3 + α )r + (α – 9)ei – 3(α – 1)ej)).
URi = ((–1)α   
1–α
(α – 1)1–α α α (2(3 + α )(a–  r ) + ei(9 – α ) + 3ej (α – 1))).
Di =  λ (ei)2 , i ≠ j, i, j = 1,2
Appendix A.2
When the government chooses the environmental standard and unions choose wa-
ges, the standards set are:
ei
S = –(31–α (α – 1)1–α  (27(–1)α 22+3α  α α –3(–1)α 24+3α  α 1+α +(–1)α  22+3α  α 2+α +
31+α  a(α – 1)α  (33 – 34α + α 2) – 32+α  11(α – 1)α r + 31+α  34α (α – 1)α r – 3α +1 (α –1)α
α 2r))/(α (315 – 288λ ) + 27(21 + 32λ ) + α 3 (41 + 32λ ) – 3α 2 (137 + 32λ )), i = 1,2
Appendix A.3
Social welfare function of country i when production costs are exogenous:
Wi = CSi + PSi - Di ,i   = 1,2, where
CSi = (2a – 2r + ei + ej)2 .
PSi = (12a2 + 12r2 – 37ei
2 – 18eiej + 3ej
2 + 12r(–3ei + ej) – 12a(2r – 3ei + ej)).

















α 2 – 9
1
  
128(α 2 – 9)2
9 (–1 + α )2 (2α – 2r + ei + ej)2
    
64 (–3 + α )2
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Environmental standards when the union chooses the wage (eS) and when the
wage is exogenous (eE) are:
eS = , eE = .
Environmental damage when the union chooses the wage (DS) and when the
wage is exogenous (DE) are:
DS = , DE = .
Consumer surpluses when the union chooses the wage (CSS) and when the wage
is exogenous (CSE) are
CSS = , CSE = .
Firms’ profits when the union chooses the wage (π S) and when costs are exoge-
nous (π E) are
π S =  (3(–862376 – 4080 6  r(–23 + 24λ ) + 225a2 (2629 +
6272λ + 3136λ 2) + 225r2 (2629 + 6272λ + 3136λ 2) + 30a(136 6  (–23 + 42λ )
–15r(2629 + 6272λ + 3136λ 2)))),
π E = 
Social welfare functions when the union chooses the wage (WS) and when costs
are exogenous (WE), are
WS =  (408(799 + 880λ ) – 400 6  r(2839 + 5975λ + 
3136λ 2) + 45a2 (14159 + 29839λ + 15680λ 2) + 45r2 (14159 + 29839λ + 
15680λ 2) + 10a(1 + λ )(40 6  (2839 + 3136λ ) – 9r(14159 + 15680λ ))),
WE =  (a – r)2 (199 + 519λ + 320λ 2)
    
2(21 + 32λ )2
1
   
10(1003 + 1120λ )2
(a – r)2 (71 + 384λ + 192λ 2)
    
2(21 + 32λ )2
1
   
50(1003 + 1120λ )2
64(a – r)2 (1 + λ )2
  
(21 + 32λ )2
36(17 6   + 140a(1 + λ ) – 140r(1 + λ )2)
     
25(1003 + 1120λ )2
121(a – r)2λ
  
2(21 + 32λ )2
(136 6   + 117a – 117r)2λ
   




136 6   + 117(a – r)
   
1003 + 1120λ
Environmental policy and wage setting 105The expressions of the market size a2 are:
ψ (λ ) =  6  (25(21 + 32λ )2 (2839 + 5975λ + 3136λ 2) +  5  (21063 + 76679λ +
91456λ 2 + 3584λ 3) 5  6  3  1  6  5   +   1  5  2  8  1  9  2  λ  +   1  0  0  3  5  2  0  λ 
2  ),
ø(λ ) = 160 (1 + λ )2 (562495 + 1529376λ + 1003520λ 2).
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